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         In recent years, the US livestock industries have undergone structural changes that have led 
to larger livestock operations with their associated environmental problems. Louisiana is within 
one of the major cow-calf production areas in the US (the Southeast).  Louisiana accounts for 
about 1.72% of the total US cattle operations. In an attempt to control degradation of the 
environment, conservation programs have been put in place, one of which is the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). The EQIP was established in the 1996 Farm Bill, involving 
the payment of government subsidies to landowners willing to implement specific cost-intensive 
conservation practices. The aim of this study is to determine, using a sequential response model, 
the awareness of EQIP and subsequent adoption of best management practices (BMPs) by cattle 
farmers in Louisiana. Results indicate that of the 504 cattle farmers who completed the survey 
questionnaire, the probability of a farmer having no knowledge of EQIP (EQIP0) is 0.481; the 
probability of a farmer having knowledge of EQIP but not applying to the program (EQIP1) is 
0.298; the probability of a farmer having knowledge of EQIP, applying to the program, but not 
receiving payment (EQIP2) is 0.152; the probability of a farmer having knowledge of EQIP, 
applying to the program, receiving payment, and not canceling the program later (EQIP3) is 
0.003; and the probability of a farmer having knowledge of EQIP, applying to the program, 
receiving payment, and canceling the program later (EQIP4) is 0.066. Variables used in the 
analysis that influenced the awareness of EQIP and the subsequent adoption of BMPs were the 




land had been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS, whether a stream flowed through or close to 
the farm, whether the farmer was diversified, the size of the cattle operation, and the percentage 



























         In recent years, the US livestock industries have undergone structural changes involving 
technological innovations, changes in production systems and specialization (Brubaker). These 
changes have led to larger and concentrated livestock operations with their related environmental 
problems. Louisiana accounts for about 1.72% of the total US cattle operations. It faces 
environmental problems related to disposal of animal waste and application of agrochemicals. In 
an attempt to control degradation of the environment by the agricultural sector, some 
conservation programs have been put in place. One such program is the Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program (EQIP).  The EQIP is a program established in the 1996 Farm Bill and 
reauthorized in the 2002 Farm Bill. This program involves the payment of government subsidies 
to landowners willing to implement specific cost-intensive conservation practices. The payments 
under this program are of two types:  (1) cost-sharing, which applies to structural and vegetative 
practices and covers a maximum of 90% of the cost of implementation for limited resource or 
beginning producers and 75% for others, and/or (2) an incentive payment that is made to 
producers to encourage them to adopt land management practices they may not otherwise have 
adopted. The EQIP offers five to ten year contracts.  Total cost–share and incentive payments are 
limited to $10,000 per person per year or $50,000 over the length of the contract (Vigil et al.).  
         The EQIP works together with other federal conservation programs that generate 
environmental benefits. Some of these programs include the Conservation Reserve Program, the 
Wetlands Reserve Program, and the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program. The EQIP is the only 
USDA conservation program that contains an explicit clause targeting funds to address 
environmental concerns arising from livestock production. Nationally, at least 50% of EQIP 
funds must be used for natural resource concerns related to livestock.  
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         Over the years of its term, the 2002 Farm Bill significantly increases EQIP funding. In 
2002, funding was at $400 million; in 2003, it increased to $700 million; and by 2004, it rose to 
$1 billion per year (Vigil et al.). An increase in the cost of production associated with adoption 
of conservation practices could be partially compensated by funds from the EQIP program. The 
Bill also removed the limit on the eligibility for larger operators to receive cost-share funds for 
animal waste management facilities. This was to enable larger operators to comply with new 
Environmental Protection Agency rules.  The question now is, are most farmers aware of the 
EQIP program, and if so, how many of them have applied for EQIP funding and subsequently 
adopted best management practices (BMPs) with the funding? 
        The aim of this study is to determine the portions of cattle farmers in Louisiana who (1) are 
aware of the EQIP program, (2) have subsequently applied for EQIP funds, and (3) have 
subsequently adopted BMPs. The types of producers most likely to have heard of the program, 
applied for funds, and subsequently adopted are also determined. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATMENT 
        The ignorance of EQIP by cattle operators that subsequently prevents them from 
implementing BMPs might be related to social isolation. In 1951, Wilkening defined social 
isolation as a lack of or a decrease in meaningful social contacts with other persons. It was 
identified as a problem that affected the response of farmers to agricultural programs. It was 
observed that social isolation was associated with lack of effective contact with neighbors or 
participation in programs for one’s own benefit. Lack of knowledge of programs may lead to a 
defense mechanism such as attacks on those who run the programs or the tendency to resist the 
acceptance of new ideas due to insecurity. It was also observed that those who had moved to 
their present locations from other communities had not adopted improved farm practices 
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recommended by agricultural programs. Other factors also associated with social isolation are 
political party affiliations, death of a spouse, personality characteristics, and physical isolation. 
         Producers’ lack of information about the profitability and the environmental benefits of 
adopting BMPs may be one of the problems affecting the control of agricultural nonpoint source 
of pollution (DeVuvst and Ipe; Feather and Amacher). This may be particularly so in industries 
where a relatively small percentage of the person’s income is derived from that industry, such as 
with cattle. 
         It has been observed that using public-supported financial incentives offered by EQIP to 
aid farmers in the adoption of BMPs is effective. However, current use of EQIP for this purpose 
has been described as “modest to meager” (Brewer et al.). Thus, there is a need to increase 
farmers’ awareness of the program.         
         Table 1 displays the number of cattle operations in Louisiana from 1993 to 2004. Large-
scale cattle operators, classified as those who own 500 or more head of cattle and calves, 
represented 1.03% to 1.38% of the cattle operations in years 1993 and 2004, respectively. Small-
scale farmers, classified as farmers who own 1 to 99 head of cattle and calves, represented 
86.67% to 84.83% of the operations in the years 1993 and 2004, respectively. This information 
shows that small-scale cattle operations represent the largest portion of Louisiana’s cattle 
operations. From year 1996, when the EQIP was first established, to 2004, the number of small-
scale cattle operations has generally declined while large-scale operations have remained fairly 
constant in number. However, in general, the number of cattle operations has been declining 
(Figure 1). The decline in the number of cattle operations suggests that farmers are going out of 
business as they are not able to meet the rising costs of production. Some of the rising costs may 
be attributed to mandatory conservation practices. Since the environmentally harmful effects of 
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some agricultural practices, e.g., manure spreading, related to livestock production cannot be 
directly regulated, indirect policies such as direct taxes on livestock operations, scale regulations 
that limit the number of animals on a given number of acres, and waste storage and handling 
regulations may be used. 
 












Year Number Number Number Number Number Number 
1993 19500 14100 2800 2400 160 40 
1994 18300 13000 2800 2300 160 40 
1995 16800 11600 2800 2200 160 40 
1996 16600 11000 2800 2560 190 50 
1997 16500 11300 2600 2350 210 40 
1998 15500 10700 2300 2300 160 40 
1999 15500 11400 2000 1900 160 40 
2000 15500 11200 2100 2000 160 40 
2001 15000 10800 2000 2000 160 40 
2002 15000 11000 1800 2000 160 40 
2003 15000 11000 1800 2000 160 40 
2004 14500 10500 1800 2000 160 40 
                  Data source: www.nass.gov
 
         In order for cattle farmers to obtain permits from the Environmental Protection Agency to 
discharge into surface waters, the farmers’ facilities must include waste handling systems that 
hold the animal waste (Innes). These policies may be among a number of factors that have 
caused the number of livestock producers to decrease from 1997 to 2000 by 72% nationwide. 
The Louisiana situation is illustrated graphically in Figure 2. Farmers who cannot handle the cost 
of taxes and the implementation of BMPs stated in these policies sell their farmland (Nickerson 
and Lynch). EQIP, however is an alternative option farmers can use if they are aware of its 
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existence. Oates et al. indicated that decentralized incentive-based policies such as the EQIP are 
more effective than centralized command-and-control and are less costly to society.  
         Another problem related to cattle operations is the large amount of manure produced that 
eventually may cause air and water pollution. Industrial man’s technology generally increases 
productivity. However, when this technology is used continuously over an extended period of 
time, environmental problems may result (Brubaker). An example is seen in the study carried out 
by Kaplan et al. Modern feedlot cattle production involves confining large numbers of animals in 
























































    
      FIGURE 1 
NUMBERS OF CATTLE AND CALF OPERATIONS IN LOUISIANA, 1970 TO 2004 
                                                                                        Data source: www.nass.gov                     
 




















































                         FIGURE 2                                                                       
ACRES OF LAND IN FARMS IN LOUISIANA, 1970 TO 2004 
                                                                                      Data source: www.nass.gov                 
        
 
         This practice also involves the use of large quantities of water and feed and produces large 
amounts of waste. The large volume of waste when applied to the land for an extended period of 
time leaches off or runs off into water bodies, thus contributing to pollution. Farmers attempting 
to reduce pollution may either reduce output or use alternative waste disposal practices. This, in 
turn, imposes costs on the agricultural community as well as affects commodity prices 
(Morrison-Paul et al.). 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
          The objectives of this study are to: (1) determine the proportions of cattle producers in 
Louisiana who: (a) have knowledge of EQIP; (b) have knowledge of EQIP but have not applied 
to the program; (c) have knowledge of EQIP, have applied, but have not been accepted for 
funding; (d) have knowledge of EQIP, have applied, have been accepted, and did not cancel the 
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program later ; and (e) have knowledge of EQIP, have applied and been accepted, but cancelled 
the contract later; and (2) determine the types of producers who fall into each of these categories. 
1.3 JUSTIFICATION 
        Environmental degradation by agricultural and non-agricultural activities has become a 
major problem facing society today. Some studies have shown that the adoption and 
implementation of BMPs help reduce pollution at little cost to the farmer. Adoption of the 
practices is said to be more effective if public supported financial incentives are offered to 
farmers through programs like EQIP (Brewer et al.; DeVuvst and Ipe).           
         Studies also indicate that, compared to direct regulations or financial incentives, increasing 
farmer’s knowledge might be a more cost-effective method of increasing the adoption of BMPs 
(Feather and Amacher; Feinerman et al.). Personnel involved in the administration of the EQIP 
are in contact with farmers and thus play an important role in educating farmers on BMPs. 
Farmers’ perceptions are changed in the process, increasing their knowledge of BMPs and of 
conservation programs. This then encourages farmers to adopt BMPs to deal with environmental 
problems related to their agricultural activities with little welfare loss and at reduced costs 
(Taylor et al.). 
         Studies suggest that, with economic incentives, farmers are more likely to adopt BMPs 
(DeVuvst and Ipe). The EQIP compensates farmers while minimizing the likelihood of farmers 
not implementing BMPs. The EQIP serves as a vessel through which policies are advanced to 
address environmental problems. Studies have shown that federal and state incentives, mandates 
and support programs, including research and development have been effective in advancing 
policies that address environmental problems (Gielecki et al.; Bouamra-Mechemache et al.).  
 7
           In summary, it is important that farmers are made aware of the EQIP because it is 
intended to give them the incentive to implement BMPs that are environmentally friendly and it 

































 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
        Previous work carried out on the awareness and adoption of conservation programs and 
BMPs by farmers forms the basis of the literature to be reviewed for this study. 
2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF BMPS 
Sustainable agricultural development is seen as a critical part of the strategy to overcome 
environmental degradation as well as poverty. Prompted by this, Antle and Diagana assessed the 
role soil carbon sequestration plays in helping developing countries deal with soil degradation 
problems, if governmental or nongovernmental entities take actions to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Factors affecting incentives for soil conservation were established property rights to 
land and the general policy environment. The results obtained from this research suggest that 
emerging policies such as those that would mitigate greenhouse gases could provide a way to 
create incentives for farmers to adopt and maintain practices that would have long-term benefits 
in reducing net greenhouse gas emissions.  
Brannan et al. conducted a study on the beneficial impacts of animal waste BMPs on 
surface water quality over a ten-year period. The parameters measured were precipitation, stream 
flow, total suspended solids, nitrogen and phosphorus. The main objective of the study involved 
determining the effectiveness of a system of animal waste BMPs. Results indicated that the 
BMPs were effective in reducing nutrient loadings, especially concentrations of all forms of 
nitrogen with the highest reduction percentage of 62% and a minimum of 35%. However, for 
phosphorus, the highest reduction was for particulate phosphorus. 
Motivated by increasing concerns about bacteria pollution, Inamdar et al. carried out a 
study on the impact of animal waste BMPs on indicator bacteria concentrations. The objective of 
the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of BMPs in reducing bacterial pollution in a 
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watershed over a ten-year period. The bacteria fecal coliforms and fecal streptococci were 
measured as pollution indicators. The BMPs implemented included manure storage facilities, 
stream fencing, water trough and nutrient management. Results showed significant decreases in 
bacteria concentrations at the watershed outlets. The study, however, suggested that BMP 
implementation alone might not ensure compliance with current water quality standards. 
Edwards et al. examined the effect of BMP implementation on storm flow quality on 
streams in Arkansas over three years. The objective of the study was to determine how effective 
BMP implementation would be on reducing storm stream-flow concentrations on nitrogen and its 
compounds, phosphorus and suspended solids. Results indicated significant decreases within the 
range of 25% to 75% a year, mainly in nitrogen compounds. The BMP responsible for the 
decrease was identified as nutrient management.  
Epp and Hamlett evaluated the cost effectiveness of seven conservation BMPs and two 
nutrient management programs for three sites of a river basin in Pennsylvania. The parameters 
measured included BMP implementation costs, field operation rests, and farm revenue. The 
present values of the net field revenue over ten years for each of the BMPs were compared to 
that of the baseline for cost effectiveness in reducing sediment and other nutrient losses. Results 
indicated that nonstructural BMPs resulted in less reduction in net farm income (and in some 
instances, increased net farm income) than did structural BMPs. When combined with nutrient 
management programs, nonstructural BMPs resulted in higher net farm incomes. 
Sun et al. examined expected returns and the environmental effects of implementing 
BMPs under risky or uncertain conditions. Results indicated that controlling agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution through BMPs alone could be very expensive. It was suggested that 
 10
federal cost-share programs designed to provide incentives to farmers to adopt economically 
efficient and environmentally friendly BMPs could make the control of pollution more feasible.  
2.2 ADOPTION: DEFINITION AND FACTORS AFFECTING IT 
         Feder et al. defined an adoption process as “the mental process an individual passes from 
first hearing about an innovation to finally adopting it”.  Adopting technology may offer an 
opportunity to increase production and income. However, factors such as a lack of credit, limited 
access to information, aversion to risk, inadequate farm size, inadequate incentives, insufficient 
human capital, absences of equipment to relieve labor shortages, and others, hold back the rapid 
adoption of these innovations (Feder et al.). Programs have sought to remove some of these 
hindrances. It was expected that providing needs via programs would not only result in adoption 
but also improve practices. However, it has been observed that the adoption behavior of farmers 
differs over time and across socioeconomic groups (Feder et al.).  
         Technology, in many cases, is introduced in packages that include several components. 
While components of a package may complement one other, some of them may be adopted 
independently. Whether technology is used more or less intensively may partially depend on 
whether it decreases or increases risk. The adoption rate of a package is retarded if there is a 
binding constraint. As such, policies, which enhance the adoption of one component, may retard 
the adoption of the others (Feder et al.). 
         Feder et al. observed that the likelihood of adopting technology increases as the 
information pertaining to the technology, the producer’s skills and income increase. They also 
discussed the role of the physical environment of the farm in technology adoption. It was 
observed that farms smaller than a critical level would not adopt new technology, and the critical 
 11
size increased with higher fixed information costs. Following are studies recently conducted that 
deal with the adoption of conservation technologies. 
         Khanna analyzed the sequential decision to adopt two site-specific technologies, soil 
testing and variable rate technology (VRT), and determined the impact of adoption on nitrogen 
productivity and corn yield. Variables used in the analysis included proxies for scale economies, 
human capital, innovations, land ownership, relative soil quality, cost of adoption and farm 
location. Results showed that farm location was a key variable influencing adoption of soil 
testing. Farm size, human capital and innovativeness of farmers had significant effects on 
adoption of VRT. It was also observed that for farms with below-average soil quality, adoption 
led to significant gains in nitrogen productivity. In above-average soil quality farms, adoption led 
to insignificant gains. 
         Habron examined the adoption of conservation practices by agricultural landowners in 
three watersheds in southwestern Oregon with the objectives to determine the characteristics of 
adopting and non-adopting landowners. Results indicated that landowners who used irrigation, 
shared management decisions with a spouse, believed in scientific experimentation, and 
discussed conservation with others were more likely to have adopted conservation practices. It 
was also observed that landowners implemented upland conservation practices such as off-
stream livestock water development and rotational grazing more than non-landowners. The study 
indicated that the adoption of BMPs depended mainly on the kind of BMPs to be implemented. 
         Rahelizatovo and Gillespie examined factors influencing the implementation of BMPs in 
the dairy industry. Results showed that factors such as farm characteristics, institutions related to 
the dairy operation and producer attitudes influenced adoption. The study also suggested the 
need to address the lack of knowledge of BMPs among dairy farmers.  
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         Onianwa et al. examined the factors affecting participation behavior of limited resource 
farmers in cost-share programs in Alabama using a binary logit model. Results indicated that 
college education, age, total farm size and being a member of a conservation association 
significantly influenced participation in cost-share programs.  
         Kim et al. examined factors affecting cattle producers’ adoption of BMPs. Results 
indicated that diversified farmers, farmers who had contact with NRCS personnel at least once a 
year, farmers level of education, the percentage of income from beef production, and whether the 
farmer operated on hilly land were the main determinants of BMP adoption.     
         Doyle and Johnson studied the complexity of increasing water use efficiency, a BMP on 
irrigated dairy farms. They observed that measuring and improving efficiency of water use is 
complex, due to certain constraints, one of which is the lack of sound technical information. The 
study suggested that the efficiency sought might not be realized if government, industry and 
others involved in natural resource management did not implement appropriate policy 
instruments to encourage adoption of BMPs. 
         Ersado et al. examined the interactions between public investments, community health, and 
the adoption of productivity and land enhancing technologies by households in the northern 
Ethiopian state of Tigray. Results indicated that time spent sick and the opportunity cost of 
caring for the sick are factors in adoption, significantly reducing the likelihood of technology 
adoption. Their findings also suggest that agencies working to improve agricultural productivity 
and land resource conservation should consider not only the financial status of potential adopters, 




2.3 INCENTIVE PROGRAMS: AWARENESS AND BENEFITS   
Feather and Amacher examined the role of information in the adoption of BMPs for water 
quality improvement. They observed that a lack of producer information regarding the 
profitability and environmental benefits of adopting may explain why their adoption has not 
occurred extensively. It was also observed that, compared to direct regulation or financial 
incentives, raising producers information levels may be a more cost-effective method of 
increasing adoption. Also, producer perception plays an important role in the decision to adopt; 
thus, education may be a means of changing these perceptions and encouraging the adoption of 
BMPs.  
         Ipe et al. defined incentive programs as guarantees that farmers adopting BMPs earn at 
least the same level of profit, on average, as those who do not adopt them. They examined the 
environmental impact of the reduction in annual emissions of nitrates and the impact of incentive 
programs on the concentration of nitrates in lake water. Results indicate that as nitrogen 
application rate was reduced, emissions declined at a decreasing rate. Comparing expected 
payment and annual reduction in emissions under different scenarios, $0.34 per acre would 
reduce nitrogen emission 34% and $1.40 per acre would reduce emission by 40%. For scenarios 
where the payment was zero, the percentages were less.  The study also suggested that 
implementing BMPs might not necessarily reduce farm profits but, on the contrary, may increase 
farm profits and reduce environmental pollution. It was also suggested that incentive programs 
be implemented as an educational effort to demonstrate the benefits of sound management 
practices. 
         Cooper examined farmers’ decisions to accept incentive payments in return for adopting a 
bundle (ten) of management practices using EQIP-type programs. Results indicated a producer’s 
 14
tendency to bundle types of management practices that may be covered under an incentive 
payment, thus increasing the adoption of these types of practices and lowering the cost of 
voluntary adoption programs. 
      DeVuyst and Ipe examined a group incentive contract as a source to promote the adoption of 
BMPs. The study was conducted because BMPs are sometimes perceived by farmers as having 
economic disadvantages. They indicated that it might be necessary to provide economic 
incentives to encourage farmers to adopt BMPs in environmentally sensitive watersheds. The 
group incentive contract is aimed at compensating farmers for actual damages due to BMP 
adoption while avoiding moral hazard problems. The study showed that, upon adoption of 
BMPs, the majority of nitrogen pollution generated in Illinois could be eliminated at little or no 
cost.  
         Brewer et al. examined the opportunity for public-supported financial incentives to 
implement integrated pest management. They observed that the new management techniques 
often result in higher financial burden to the grower. In order for Integrated Pest Management to 
be adopted, they found a need to deliver public-supported financial incentives to farmers. The 
study explored opportunities and challenges associated with using EQIP. It was observed that 
25% of the farmers surveyed recognized the program’s use as a way of introducing and 
implementing the management technique. For 75% of the farmers, implementation of the 
management practice was improved after educational efforts by the NRCS advisory process 
under the EQIP program. The study further suggested that the case is strong for using public-
supported financial incentives as a means to aid farmers in adoption, particularly through EQIP. 
It was observed that the use of EQIP for getting farmers to adopt BMPs is modest to meager. 
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        Gauthier et al. studied the influence of cost share and EQIP incentive payments on the 
adoption of 18 BMPs by Louisiana dairy farmers. Results indicated that contracts with incentive 
programs were necessary for farmers to adopt BMPs. In addition, factors that influenced 
adoption included socio-economic and financial variables, level of education attained by the 
farmer, the presence of an heir, net farm income, and the farmer’s affinity for the environment. 
         The rate of tropical biodiversity loss compelled Langholz et al. to carry out a study that 
involved the interview of 68 private nature reserve owners to learn more about one of Costa 
Rica’s incentive programs that promoted conservation of rainforests. Questions asked included 
the following: To what extent, if any, has the incentive program led to expansion of the formal 
park system? Has the program been reaching its intended audience? What motivates landowners 
to sign up for the program? What additional incentives do landowners want and what trade-offs 
would they make to get them? Does the program offer only a short-term fix, or is there evidence 
that its effect will persist? Results indicated that, in terms of whether the program had reached its 
intended audience, 80% of nonparticipant reserve owners knew of the government programs 
designed to help landowners protect natural areas. Forty-four percent of them, after hearing the 
description of the program, had heard of a wildlife conservation law but not that particular 
program. Fifty-four percent of the landowners said they would be interested in joining the 
program, 20% were not interested, and the remainders were undecided.  The study also examined 
the extent to which those incentives were being utilized by landowners and honored by the 
government. Seventy-three percent of the landowners said they had not yet evoked the squatter’s 
protection incentive. Forty-one percent of the landowners asked for assistance. Ninety-one 
percent of the program participants stated that they planned to continue with the program. Only 
one owner wanted to leave the program.  
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         Copper and Keim carried out a study on incentive payments to encourage farmer adoption 
of water quality protection practices. The study examined five management practices: integrated 
pest management, legume crediting, manure testing, split application of nitrogen and soil 
moisture testing. Variables used in the analysis included total acres operated, level of education 
of the operator, operator years of experience, operator net farm income, number of days annually 
the operator worked off the farm, type of farm owned by the operator and farm location. Results 
indicated that number of days annually the operator worked off the farm negatively influenced 
adoption. However, in general, for level of education, only one of the coefficients estimated for 
the management practices was negative. As such, the results indicated that the higher the level of 
education of the farmer, the more likely he was to adopt the practice. Total acres operated had 
two of the coefficient signs negative. Operator’s years of experience had only one of the 
coefficients with a negative sign, indicating that the greater the experience, the less likely the 
farmer was to adopt the practice. Operator’s net farm income had one negative sign, indicating 
that the higher the net farm income, the more likely the operator was to adopt the practices. The 
variable, type of farm owned by the operator, had only one of the coefficients with a negative 
sign, indicating that the type of farm affected adoption of the management practices. Farm 
location also influenced the decision to adopt the management practice. Farmers could thus be 
encouraged to voluntarily adopt environmentally sound management practices through the use of 
incentive payments. 






ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE AND DATA  
         This chapter is made up of three sections; the first gives a description of the analytical 
technique. The second gives a description of the survey results, dependent and independent 
variables used in the analysis, and the final section consists of tests carried out in the Analysis.    
3.1 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE 
3.1.1 The Qualitative Discrete Choice Model 
        The qualitative discrete choice model is a powerful analytical technique for understanding 
an individual’s wants (Greene, 2000). It predicts the decision made by an individual, Y (choice 
of mode, choice of route, etc.) as a function of any number of variables, X. Assuming an 
individual chooses from among alternatives that provide different levels of utility, then the utility 
function at the level z can be represented as:       
                     (Z=1, 2, 3… z),                                                      (1) ε z+xβ z +0β= zY
where β represents parameter estimates of the explanatory variables, β0 is a constant and the 
intercept, and ε is the error term containing all other unobserved variables that affect the decision 
made (Mirer; Hill et al.). The qualitative discrete choice model was proposed for this study 
because it has certain advantages over other analytical tools: (1) a discrete choice experiment 
may resemble more closely the actual situation; (2) it can be designed to allow different features 
for different variables; (3) it allows for the evaluation of a set of alternatives rather than 
evaluating them one at a time; (4) it allows for choices to be modeled directly and not inferred or 
derived; (5) the “not chosen” option of a discrete choice model allows for the estimation of the 
impact of a situation not occurring; and (6) it assumes that choices made by individuals can be 
predicted based on a limited set of quantifiable factors and that people are essentially rational 
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decision-makers who seek to make choices that maximize their utility (Greene, 2000). The 
relationship between the underlying factors and the probability of the individual choosing a 
particular alternative is assumed to bear a particular functional form such as a logit or probit 
function (Hill et al.). Discrete choice models have been used in many studies, some of which are 
Coble et al., who applied a binomial probit model to examine multiple peril crop insurance 
demand; Cooper and Keim, who used a discrete choice model to predict farmer adoption of 
BMPs as a function of a payment offer; Smith and Baquet., who carried out an analysis of the 
demand for multiple peril crop insurance for wheat farms; Zabel, who analyzed the relationship 
between hours of work and labor force participation; Brox et al., who analyzed item nonresponse 
in contingent valuation surveys when estimating willingness to pay for improved water quality; 
Thornton, who used logit models to examine the influence of economic and non-economic 
factors on the choice of medical specialty by new physicians; Morey et al., who used a repeated 
three-level nested logit model to examine the participation and site choice for Atlantic salmon 
fishing; and Kilkenny and Huffman, who determined how labor force and income support 
program participation varies across midwestern rural and urban areas. 
3.1.2 The Sequential Response Model (Sequential Analysis)
        The specific model used for this study is the sequential response discrete choice model. 
Johnson mentioned that during the early 1940’s to late 1950’s, there was no recognized field of 
statistical theory known as sequential analysis. However, a variety of ad hoc sequential sampling 
methods in response to many specific problems were constructed. The sequential probability 
ratio test, s.p.r.t, which is based on the likelihood ratio, gave rise to sequential analysis. The 
s.p.r.t procedure is said to provide a starting point for the construction of other tests in many 
specific problems. It has been observed that recent sequential procedures have been introduced in 
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the context of comparative clinical trials where an estimate of treatment difference, accompanied 
by a confidence interval, will usually be required (Whitehead). Other works using sequential 
analysis have examined sequential designs in nonlinear problems (Hu), the bias of maximum 
likelihood estimation following a sequential test (Whitehead), group sequential distribution-free 
methods for the analysis of multivariate observations (Su and Lachin), and simple methods for 
constructing exact tests for sequentially designed experiments (Andrews and Herzberg).  
Sequential response models are of two types. The first depends on whether the treatment 
sequence is fixed and the second depends on whether the selection of the treatment of the next 
experimental unit or group of units depends upon the previous results (Andrews and Herzberge). 
The second model type is chosen for this study. This sequential analysis involves five levels and 
each level (except for the first) depends on previous results.   
         In many sequential analyses where the outcome is discrete instead of continuous, simple 
regression methods such as ordinary least squares are not suitable. The ordinary least squares 
results are inefficient and biased. Logit models are normally used in analyses with discrete 
outcome variables, yz.  A logit model assumes that there is a continuous unobserved dependent 
variable yz* that is linearly related to various explanatory variables and also linked with the 
observed discrete outcome variable, yz, by a link function. This link function describes the 
probability that yz takes on a particular value, given the value of yz* (Chiu and Khoo). 
Limitations associated with the sequential logit model are that, in some cases, the sequentially 
conducted process affects the probability distribution, thus increasing the variance substantially 
(Whitehead). The number of observations, N, required for an unbiased estimation depends on the 
explanatory variables, m and the expected pseudo R2: 
N > [8(1-R2) / R2] + (m-1). 
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Sequential analysis splits continuous variables into more alternatives that can increase m. The 
potential gain from sequential analysis can, however, outweigh the losses (Andrews and 
Herzberg). 
          The LIMDEP (Greene, 1995) software would be used in running four levels of binary logit 
models where the first level is estimated from the entire sample, then subsequent ones from the 
subsample of the preceding level after eliminating “no” observations. The sequential response 
probability is then obtained using the results obtained from the series of binary logit model runs. 
The cumulative distribution function for a logistic distribution is given as (Greene, 2000): 





where e-x is the same as exp(x), notation that is used later in this thesis. 
        The probability, P, that an individual chooses alternative k over alternative m at level z is 
given as:  
Pz =P [yzk ≥yzm ] 
where m≠k. 
Pz =P [β’xzk ≥ β’xzm ]   
where m≠k, β’x= β0+βx, εz=0 and variance=δ2. Thus, for a logit model where yz = 1,  
 




F(=                                         (2)   
  and where yz =0,  
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                                P(yz=0 │ x’t)
))x,β zexp(+1(
)x,β zexp( =)x,β zF-1(=
                                        (3) 
where F(β’xz) is the cumulative distribution function with respect to β’xz (Hill et al.). Thus, the 
actual probability estimates for the sequential response model, Pz, where z= 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, can be 
represented as follows:  
                           P0= [1-F (β’x1)]  
                            P0
)1x'βexp(+1
)1x'βexp(=                                                                            (4)   
                             P1= F (β’x1)[1- F (β’x2)]  





=                                                        (5) 
                           P2= F (β’x1) F (β’x2) [1- F (β’x3)]  








=                             (6) 
 
                           P3= F (β’x1) F (β’x2) F (β’x3) [1- F (β’x4)]  
 










=              (7)  
 
                            P4= F (β’x1) F (β’x2) F (β’x3) F (β’x4)     
 












=           (8) 
 
 where * represents a multiplication sign. βz are the sequential analysis coefficient estimates for 
the individual explanatory variables at each level z. the individual βz’s  can be obtained using the 
estimator, f(y)= py (1-p)1-y, where y= [0,1] and p is the probability that y takes the value 1 (Hill et 
al.; Greene, 2000). 
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          Having derived the probabilities for the sequential response model, there is the need to 
examine the effect of one-unit changes in the explanatory variables on the dependent variables 
yz, i.e., the marginal effects. 
3.1.3 Marginal Effects 
        Marginal effects are nonlinear functions of the parameter estimates and the levels of the 
explanatory variables that cannot be inferred directly from the parameter estimates (Anderson 
and Newell). Determining the marginal effect of a dummy variable is different from that of a 
continuous variable. The marginal effects for dummy variables can be derived using different 
methods, one of which follows. Let a particular dummy variable at a level, z, be represented by 
Xz for a binary operation where Xz can take only values 0 and 1. In order to obtain the marginal 
effect of Xz at each level z, the actual values of Xz (0 and 1) are plugged into the probability 
equations (4) to (8) instead of the means and the difference in the resultant values are the 
marginal effects.  For other dummy variables in the models, if their means are less than 0.5, the 
value 0 replaces the mean. For means greater than or equal to 0.5, the value 1 replaces it. For 
continuous variables, means are used. Both probabilities are obtained for yz when xz=1 and when 
xz=0 and the difference between the probabilities gives the marginal effect, ME: 
∆Pz= P [yz│ xt=1]-P [yz│xt =0] (Greene, 2000).    







=                                                                  (9) 
         The marginal effects for continuous variables are obtained by taking derivatives of the 
predicted probabilities for the individual variables (Maddala). Using calculus, the derivatives of 
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equations (2) and (4) are obtained as follows. The quotient rule in calculus states that for a given 
function f(x) =u/v, its derivative is(Tan):    
                                








    
As such, the derivative of (2) is derived as:            
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The chain rule for an exponential function, F(x) = e(fx) where fx is a differential function, is given 






(fx)e ∂  
 thus, 
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 x∂ /)zx'β(∂)zx'βexp(  -=
x∂
))zx'β(F(∂   
                          ( )[ ] κx'β )1x'βf(=2zx'βexp+1
zkβ)zxβexp(-=
x∂
))zx'β(F(∂                          (10) 
Going through the same calculation process as for equation (10) above, the derivative of 
equation (2) will give rise to equation (11) below:            
                 ( )[ ] κ1 x'β )]x'βf(( -[12zx'βexp+1
zkβ)zx'βexp(= 
x∂
))zx'βF(-1 (∂                           (11)
           Thus, with the help of equations (10) and (11) and the product rule which states that, for a 














  (Tan). 
The derivatives of equations (4) to (8) are as follows, respectively:  
                                      ME0 =∂ [1-F(β’x1)]/ ∂x                                                                   (12) 
                                     ME0 = [1-f (β’x1)] β1k 
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                       ME1= [∂ (F (β’x1)])/ ∂x] + [∂ (1-F (β’x2)])/ ∂x]                                           (13) 
                       ME1 = {F (β’x1) [1-f (β’x2) β2k]} + {[1-F (β’x2)] f (β’x1) β2k} 





































































































































































   (13) 
                        
 
                       ME2 = {∂F (β’x1) /∂x}+ {∂F(β’x2)/∂x}+ {∂[1-F(β’x3)]/∂x}                            (14)      
                       ME2= {F (β’x1)F(β’x2)[1-f(β’x3) β3k} + {F (β’x1) f (β’x2 )β2k [1- F (β’x3) ]} 
                                   + {f (β’x1) β1k F(β’x2)[1- F (β’x3)] } 
 (Equation 14 continued on the next page) 
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                      ME3= ∂F (β’x1)/∂x + ∂F(β’x2)/∂x + ∂F(β’x3)/∂x + ∂(1-F (β’x4))/∂x               (15) 
                      ME3={F(β’x1)F(β’x2)F(β’x3)[(1-f(β’x4)β4k]}+{F(β’x1)F(β’x2)f (β’x3)β3k  
                             [1-F(β’x4)]}+{F(β’x1)f(β’x2)β2kF(β’x3)[1-F(β’x4)]}+{f (β’x1)β1kF(β’x2) 
                             F(β’x3)[1- F (β’x4)]}                         
 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































     (15)              
                        
 
                        ME4=∂F(β’x1)/∂x + ∂F(β’x2)/∂x + ∂F(β’x3)/∂x + ∂F(β’x4)/∂x                       (16) 
                       ME4={F(β’x1)F(β’x2)F(β’x3)(f(β’x4)β4k}+{F(β’x1)F(β’x2)f (β’x3)β3k  
                              F(β’x4)}+{F(β’x1)f(β’x2)β2kF(β’x3)F(β’x4)}+{f (β’x1)β1kF(β’x2) 
                              F(β’x3)F(β’x4)}   
                                                             (Equation 16 continued on the next page) 
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3.1.4 Standard Errors 
        Whitehead observed that the estimated variance for a sequential analysis could be calculated 
from the data since its value would not be altered by the fact that the test was conducted 
sequentially. Thus, the standard errors of the parameter estimates calculated for the sequential 
response model can be determined. The square root of the variance, σx2, of a variable xz gives 
rise to the standard error, se(x) (Ramanathan; Greene, 2000): 
                                                      2xσ=)x(se                                                                       (17)                             
However, the covariance, ρ, divided by σx2, gives rise to the estimated parameter, βz (Mirer; Hill 
et al.; Wooldridge): 
                                                 βz = ρ / σx2   and   σx2= ρ / βz. 
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Thus, equation (17) can be rewritten as: 
                                            
zβ
ρ
=se(x)                                                                                (18)   
The t-statistic determines whether a variable, xz, is significant. The t-statistic estimator is 
calculated as follows:  
                                             
σ
0H-zβ=stat-t                                                                           (19) 
where H0 is the null hypothesis. Thus, if H0: β = 0, then equation (19) can be stated as:  
                                          
)x(se
zβ=stat-t                                                                                (20)                              
3.2 SURVEY AND DESCRIPTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
         In summer, 2003, 1,500 cattle producers in Louisiana were surveyed to determine their 
knowledge of EQIP, adoption of BMPs, and willingness to accept EQIP cost-share payments for 
the adoption of rotational grazing (Kim et al.). An initial questionnaire was sent to the producers, 
followed by a postcard reminder two weeks later, and followed by a second questionnaire two 
weeks after the postcard.  Those mailed surveys included farmers with less than 20 animals 
(26.5%), 20-49 animals (23.5%), 50-99 animals (23.5%), and 100 or more animals (26.5%).  Of 
the surveys sent out, 504 were returned completed while 270 were returned incomplete. 
Guidelines provided by Dillman for maximizing return rate were considered. The overall return 
rate was 41%.  
         In the present study, the dependent variables are represented as follows: EQIPz represents 
the dependent variable Yz at the level z as indicated in equation (1). EQIP0 represents the level 
where individuals have no knowledge of EQIP. EQIP1 represents the level where individuals 
have knowledge of EQIP but have not applied to the program. EQIP2 represents the level where 
individuals have knowledge of EQIP, have applied to the program, but have not received any 
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form of payment. EQIP3 represents the level where individuals have knowledge of EQIP, have 
applied to the program, have received some form of payment, and have not cancelled the 
contract. Finally, EQIP4 represents the level where individuals have knowledge of EQIP, have 
applied to the program, have received some form of payment, but cancelled the contract later. 
For the logit analysis, the dependent variables used are as follows: KNEQIP represents whether 
the farmer has knowledge of EQIP. APEQIP represents whether the farmer applied for EQIP 
funds. PEQIP represents whether the farmer received payment under EQIP. CNEQIP represents 
whether the farmer canceled EQIP. 
         Table 2 shows the units and definitions of the explanatory variables and Table 3 gives the 
expected signs for the logit and sequential models. LOWNED is the ratio of the land owned by 
the farmer used in the beef cattle operation divided by the acres of land devoted exclusively to 
the beef cattle operation. Four-hundred ninety-four cattle operators answered this survey 
question. Brox et al. observed that an increase in the ownership of land increased the willingness 
to pay for improved water quality. It is expected that producers owning a greater percentage of 
the land for their cattle operation are more likely to be aware of EQIP since this program is 
aimed at improving the environment, which includes improved water quality. Producers who 
own a greater portion of their farmland are expected to have greater interest in programs that 
would eventually lead to long-run productivity where the benefits accrue directly to the 
landowner (Gates; Hatcher). These farmers are, thus, more likely to apply to the program and 
less likely to cancel the program if accepted. 
         FARMSTRM represents whether a stream runs through the farm. A value of 1 indicates 
that a stream runs through the farm and 0 indicates the stream is more than a mile away from the 
farm or that the nearest stream to the farm is less than or equal to a mile away. 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF UNITS AND DEFINITIONS OF THE  EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
 
Variable  units Definition 
LOWNED ratio Land owned by farmer 
NRCS 0-1 
(dummy) 
Number of times a farmer met with NRCS officials in 2002: 
1 = ≥ 4 times and 
0 = 0-3 times 
FARMSTRM 0-1 
(dummy) 
How close the farm is to a stream: 
1= ≤ 1mile and 
0= > 1mile 
NAGE years Age of the farmer reduced by a factor of  10 
HS 0-1 
(dummy) 
Level of farmers education: 
0= no high school diploma 
1= high school  diploma or higher  
PBEEFINC % Percentage of net household income that comes from the beef production 
DIVERSE 1-7 Number of enterprises owned by the farmer 
LCES 0-1 
(dummy) 
Number of times a farmer met with LCES agents in 2002: 




1 = land has been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS 
0 = land has not been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS 






         Four-hundred ninety-six cattle operators answered this question. Farmers with streams 
running through their farms are at greater risk of polluting streams and would be targeted by 
groups concerned about environmental quality. Thus, these farmers are expected to be more 
aware of EQIP due to their resultant greater contact with regulatory agencies. In the case of 
higher cost associated with implementing conservation plans, these farmers are expected to 
participate in EQIP (Nickerson and Lynch). Thus, nearness of a farm to a stream is expected to 
positively influence a farmer’s knowledge of EQIP, his application to the program, the 
probability of being accepted and the farmer’s subsequent adoption of BMPs under EQIP.  
         NAGE represents the actual age of the farmer divided by ten. Four-hundred eighty-five 
cattle operators indicated their age. Age is often used in technology adoption studies, with results 
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frequently showing negative impacts on adoption (e.g., Brox et al., Kilkenny et al., Roberts and 
Key). Some farmers are likely to become comfortable with existing management practices, and 
do not have the incentive to invest greatly in technology that they may not use for an extended 
time period (especially if they plan on retiring soon). As such it is expected that older farmers 
would be less likely to apply to and adopt BMPs under EQIP. However, for older farmers who 
do apply, it is indeterminate a priori whether they would be more or less likely to be accepted or 
would cancel later.  
        HS represents the holding of a high school diploma by the farmer. The variable is coded as 
0 if the farmer has education less than high school and 1 if the level of education of the farmer is 
high school and higher.  Four-hundred ninety-nine cattle farmers indicated their level of 
education. Foltz and Chang; Nickerson and Lynch; and Smith and Baquet showed that farmers’ 
level of education positively influenced adoption. Educated farmers are more likely to be aware 
of EQIP since they are generally more likely to be informed of programs and technology. Based 
on the studies mentioned above, it is expected that more highly educated farmers are more likely 
to apply to EQIP, and less likely to cancel the program if accepted.  
        PBEEFINC is the percentage of household net income from the beef operation, with five 
outcomes of 20% intervals from less than 20% to 100%. Five-hundred and four cattle operators 
answered this survey question. Other studies conducted on the adoption of technology, programs 
and water quality show that farmers with higher percentages of household net income from their 
farm operations are expected to have greater knowledge of technology and programs (Foltz and 
Chang; Nickerson and Lynch; Smith and Baquet). It is expected that farmers with higher 
percentages of household net income would seek information about their businesses that would 
ensure a steady flow of income. Thus, a higher percentage of household net income from the 
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beef operation is expected to positively influence the awareness of EQIP and application to the 
program.  
         DIVERSE represents the number of enterprises other than cattle on the farm. The values 
for this variable range between 0 and 7 for the surveyed farmers. A value of 0 indicates that the 
farmer did not deal in any other agricultural enterprise besides cattle. Five-hundred-three farmers 
answered this survey question. Farmers with greater numbers of enterprises are expected to more 
likely have utilized EQIP, since they may have adopted conservation practices for another 
enterprise using the program (Hatcher).  More diversified farmers are, thus, expected to have 
greater awareness of EQIP, to more likely have applied to the program and to more likely have 
adopted BMPs under the program.   
        NFARMAC is the number of acres of land that make up the entire farm operation, divided 
by 100 for estimation purposes. Foltz and Chang observed that in the adoption of technology by 
dairy farmers, larger farms were more likely to have adopted since implementing BMPs on 
larger farms would be more cost effective. It is, thus, expected that producers who operate larger 
parcels of land for their entire farm operations are more likely to be informed of EQIP, more 
likely to apply for EQIP funds and to have greater interest in conservation practices.  
         NRCS is a dummy variable indicating the farmer had business contact with the Natural 
Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) at least four times in the year 2002.  NRCS personnel 
have the major responsibility of dissemination of information on EQIP. Thus, farmers who have 
been in contact with NRCS personnel are more likely to have heard of EQIP, are more likely to 
apply and be accepted, and more likely to subsequently adopt BMPs under EQIP.  
         LCES is a dummy variable indicating the farmer had business contact with the Louisiana 
Cooperative Extension Service at least 4 times in 2002. LCES agents, like NRCS personnel, 
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have responsibility for dissemination of information involving BMPs to farmers. Thus, farmers 
who have been in contact with LCES agents are more likely to have heard about EQIP, are more 
likely to apply and if accepted, to adopt BMPs under EQIP.  
          HELA is a dummy variable indicating the farmer had land classified as “highly erodible” 
by NRCS. In the 1930’s, much US farmland was subjected to moderate to severe erosion. When 
conservation programs were put in place, awareness developed among farmers, and soon, farm 
families were operating using greater conservation practices (Saloutos). A “highly erodible” farm 
requires BMPs to preserve the land. It is expected that farmers with “highly erodible” lands are 
more likely to apply to EQIP and be accepted. The probability of canceling the program later is 
expected to be low.  
         MALE represents the gender of the farmer, with 0 representing female and 1 representing 
male. Brox et al. and Paudel et al.’s studies on the willingness to pay for amenities such as water 
quality and recreational facilities indicated that men were more likely to pay to improve water 
quality and, as such would go the extra length to seek information. In studies in developing 
countries men have been the major owners of land due to bias in land allocation and inheritance 
and as such, have been the more likely technology adopters (Akinwumi and Chianu; Doss and 
morris). However for a program like EQIP that provides farmers with funding to protect the 
environment, it would be expected that both females and males would both be interested i.  
         The expected signs for the variables in the sequential models (Table 3) can be derived 
using reasoning based on the expected signs of the variables for the logit models in Table 3 if: 
(1) EQIP0= KNEQIP=0. Based on the signs for KNEQIP independent variables in Table 3, it is 
expected that the variables in the model EQIP0 would be the opposite of those in the KNEQIP 
model. (2) EQIP1= (KNEQIP=1) (APEQIP=0). This represents the probability of a farmer 
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knowing about but not applying to the EQIP. As such, the variables in the model EQIP1 would 
be expected to be the opposite in sign of those in the APEQIP model. 
 
TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF THE  EXPECTED SINGS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
FOR THE  SEQUENTIAL AND THE LOGIT MODELS 
 
Variable  units KNEQIP APEQIP PEQIP CNEQIP EQIP0 EQIP1 EQIP2 EQIP3 EQIP4
LOWNED ratio + + ? + - - + - + 
NRCS 0-1 
(dummy) + + + - - - - + - 
RSTRM 0-1 
(dummy) + + + - - - - + - 
AGE years + - ? ? - + ? ? ? 
HS 0-1 
(dummy) + + ? - - - ? + - 
PBEEFINC % + + ? - - - ? ? - 
DIVERSE 1-7 + + + - - - - + - 
LCES 0-1 
(dummy) + + ? - - - ? ? - 
HELA 0-1 
(dummy) + + + _ - - - + - 
NFARMAC Acres/100 + + ? + - - ? ? + 
MALE 0-1 
(dummy) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
  
(3) EQIP2= (KNEQIP=1) (APEQIP=1) (PEQIP=0). This represents the probability of a farmer 
knowing of EQIP, applying for EQIP funds, but not receiving EQIP funding. Variables in the 
model EQIP2 are expected to have signs opposite to those in the PEQIP model.   
 (4) EQIP3= (KNEQIP=1) (APEQIP=1) (PEQIP=1) (CNEQIP=0). This represents the probability 
of a farmer knowing of EQIP, applying for EQIP funds, being accepted, and not canceling EQIP 
later. The variables in the EQIP3 model are expected to have signs opposite to those in the 
CNEQIP model. Finally, 
 (5) EQIP4= (KNEQIP=1) (APEQIP=1) (PEQIP=1) (CNEQIP=1). This represents the probability 
of a farmer knowing of EQIP, applying for EQIP funds, being accepted, but canceling EQIP 
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later. As such, variables in this mode are expected to have signs that are the same as those for the 
CNEQIP model. 
3.3 TESTS CARRIED OUT IN THE ANALYSIS    
         Additional tests carried out in this study were for heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity.  
3.3.1 Heteroskedasticity 
         It is assumed that in a linear regression model, the error terms εz are homoskedastic; i.e., 
that all the observations used in the model have the same variance, σ2 εz = σ2 z.  However, when 
the variances across observations vary, it is said that there is a problem of heteroskedasticity. If 
heteroskedasticity is not corrected, the standard errors, SE, estimated for the model are not 
correct, thus affecting the hypothesis tests. F-tests are usually unreliable under 
heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity is more likely to occur using cross sectional and panel data 
than time series data (Ramanathan; Mittelhammer et al; Wooldridge; Hill et al.). Generally, 
heteroskedasticity can be detected by examining the residuals when the model is run using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and the residuals are plotted against the different independent 
variables or the predicted dependent variables. In this study, the Park test is used to test for 
heteroskedasticity (Hill et al.). 
         Using the Park test, the variance is regressed on the independent variables:  
ln(σ2 z   )= b1 + b2 lnxz + vz. 
If b2 is significantly different from 0, then there is a problem of heteroskedasticity. In the absence 
of the variance, the squared residuals can be used: 
  ln(εz)2= b1 + b2lnxz + vz. 
Heteroskedasticity can be remedied by using weighed least squares when the standard deviation 
σz is known (Hill et al.).  
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3.3.2 Multicollinearity 
         Multicollinearity is a data problem that can pose estimation difficulties in measuring 
processes such as technology adoption (Mittelhammer et al.).  For a model that consists of more 
than one independent variable, some of these variables may correlate, resulting in larger variances 
and, thus, causing the problem of multicollinearity. There are two types of multicollinearity. (1) 
Perfect correlation is where the correlation is 1, which results in serious failure of the assumptions 
of the model. The only remedy for this type of problem is to drop one of the variables. (2) Near 
multicollinearity is where the variables are not perfectly correlated (Rammathan). Serious 
multicollinearity reduces the precision of parameter estimates to the extent that confidence in their 
signs and magnitudes is very low and severe statistical problems may arise (Mittelhammer et al.). 
Other signs that indicate the presence of multicollinearity are: (1) it is difficult to separate the 
individual effects of the model components; (2) small changes in the data produce wide swings in 
the parameter estimates; (3) coefficients may have very high standard errors and low significance 
levels; (4) the R2 of the model is quite high; and (5) coefficients may have the wrong signs 
(Ramanathan; Mittelhammer et al.; Wooldridge).  
         Multicollinearity can be determined in several ways, some of which are as follows: the 
correlation coefficient is a measure of the degree of relationship between variables (Berkson). It is 
obtained in a least-squares fit of a regression line. The correlation coefficient can be determined 







where r is the correlation coefficient, σx is the standard deviation of x, and σxy is the partial 
standard deviation of x given y (Berkson). The correlation coefficient must vary from zero to one 
in absolute values. The smaller r is, the poorer the agreement with the line of regression. If r = 1, 
 37
the value of y falls exactly on the line of regression and the correlation is said to be perfect. On 
the other hand, if r = 0, the line of regression coincides with the x-axis, suggesting that the value 
of y is its own deviation from the line of regression, indicating that there is no correlation 
(Roeser). Correlation between variables is said to be strong if the value of r is 0.8 or greater. In 
order to correct for high correlation between independent variables, one of them is generally 
dropped from the model. 
           The variance inflation factor, VIF, is calculated as: 
VIF = 1/(1- R2).  
Using this method, each independent variable is regressed against each other variable to obtain 
the VIF. A value of VIF in excess of five indicates the presence of multicollinearity (Kennedy).  
         Finally, the Collins test involves determining the Condition number or index (CI). A CI 
value in excess of 20 indicates the presence of multicollinearity. The correlation coefficient, VIF 
















CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS AND DISCUSION 
         This chapter reports and discusses the econometric model, including the diagnostic results 
of the heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity tests; and the results of the logit and sequential 
logit models.    
4.1 HETEROSKEDASTICITY TEST RESULTS  
         Using the Park test, results obtained for the model KNEQIP showed P-values greater than 
0.10, indicating that heteroskedasticity was not detected at either the 5% or 10% levels(Table 4).  
TABLE 4: HETEROSKEDASTICITY RESULTS FOR KNEQIP 
Heteroscedastic Logit Model for Binary Data 
Disturbance Variance Terms for Marginal Effects 
KNEQIP 
Variable ME St. Error t-stat P-value 
LOWNED -2.94E-03 1.41E-02 -0.208 0.8354 
NRCS -3.83E-03 1.35E-02 -0.284 0.7763 
FARMSTRM 7.22E-05 4.10E-03 0.018 0.9860 
NAGE -6.33E-04 1.89E-03 -0.335 0.7373 
HS 1.95E-03 6.06E-03 0.322 0.7473 
PBEEFINC -2.65E-03 1.15E-02 -0.230 0.8178 
DIVERSE -3.15E-03 9.14E-03 -0.345 0.7303 
LCES 6.57E-03 1.85E-02 0.356 0.7222 
HELA 2.00E-02 5.80E-02 0.345 0.7299 
NFARMAC -1.14E-03 3.46E-03 -0.328 0.7426 
MALE 1.41E-04 2.49E-02 0.006 0.9955 
 
4.2 MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST RESULTS 
          Table 5 gives the correlation coefficients for the explanatory variables. It can be observed 
from the results that there is very little correlation between the explanatory variables. The highest 
correlation coefficient is 0.429, between LCES and NRCS. However, this is well below the “rule 
of thumb” critical level of 0.80 (Kennedy). These results suggest that multicollinearity is not 
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problematic in the model. However, variance inflation factors (VIF) and the Collins test (CI) 
provide further insight. 
         Results of the VIF and CI are displayed in Tables 6 and 7. It can be observed that the VI 
values are less than 5 for all of the explanatory variables. This indicates that the VI test did not 
detect multicollinearity in the data for any of the equations. 
 
TABLE 5: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE EXLPANATORY 
VARIABLES 
 
Variables LOWNED NRCS FARMSTRM AGE COLLE PBEEFINC DIVERSE LCES HELA NFARMAC MALE 
LOWNED 1           
NRCS -0.02222 1          
FARMSTRM -0.09738 -0.01722 1         
NAGE 0.15512 -0.10721 -0.06603 1        
HS -0.01741 0.05065 -0.04718 -0.24837 1       
PBEEFINC -0.08342 0.04273 -0.04399 0.01123 0.04662 1      
DIVERSE 0.06268 0.19060 -0.01984 -0.09581 0.05967 0.08660 1     
LCES -0.10257 0.42893 -0.03742 -0.12863 0.06253 0.05709 0.20812 1    
HELA 0.09296 0.09360 -0.01893 0.03228 0.04311 -0.00922 0.08338 0.03709 1   
NFARMAC -0.18415 0.13122 -0.04489 -0.07308 0.04559 0.24475 0.20096 0.07616 0.02628 1  
MALE -0.08674 0.06910 -0.00625 0.07380 -0.07902 -0.01644 0.03428 0.03469 0.05718 0.03098 1 
 
         However, using the Collins test, the values for one variable in each equation, were greater 
than 20, as seen in the Table 7. However, Belsky et al. suggested that condition indexes of 
greater than 100 are the greatest threat to variance inflation and thus, to regression estimates. 




TABLE 6: RESULTS OF MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST, TEST VARIANCE 
INFLATION FACTORS 
 










Constant 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
LOWNED 1.15426 1.17019 1.14417 1.25385 
NRCS 1.28253 1.27070 1.28866 1.45129 
FARMSTRM 1.04703 1.06054 1.04938 1.20142 
NAGE 1.15565 1.21791 1.15527 1.32263 
HS 1.18505 1.14679 1.18224 1.20475 
PBEEFINC 1.08144 1.08254 1.08428 1.42815 
DIVERSE 1.13063 1.13589 1.13811 1.28581 
LCES 1.15935 1.15605 1.15962 1.28296 
HELA 1.06174 1.09172 1.06157 1.18738 
NFARMAC 1.15796 1.17234 1.16138 1.55459 











Multicollinearity ≥ 5  
          














                                 










1 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
2 2.94812 3.06024 2.93904 3.05988 
3 3.05555 3.23714 3.04413 3.34975 
4 3.58712 4.37732 3.56664 5.01363 
5 4.37409 4.86213 4.36436 5.68162 
6 4.98972 5.61736 4.94985 6.68348 
7 5.75690 6.09266 5.73639 7.25875 
8 6.41483 6.90759 6.40224 7.87923 
9 8.17725 8.18588 8.08064 8.50322 
10 8.68981 10.01950 8.67250 12.03187 
11 15.54961 19.23886 15.21748 21.36061 
12 27.23272 29.39546 26.99878 33.65071  
 
Multicollinearity ≥ 20     
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4.3 NON-SEQUENTIAL MODEL RESULTS 
4.3.1 Logit Model Results 
         There are four models involved in the logit analysis. The models are as follows: KNEQIP, 
APEQIP, PEQIP and CNEQIP. The probability of a farmer being aware of EQIP is indicated by 
the results of KNEQIP. The probability of a farmer applying to EQIP is represented by the 
results APEQIP. PEQIP indicates the results for the probability of a farmer receiving EQIP 
funding. CNEQIP indicates the results for the probability of a farmer later canceling the EQIP.  
        Observations with values of 0 for the dependent variable in the previous model are 
eliminated from the data before the next model is run. For example, only observations where 
KNEQIP = 1 were used for the model, APEQIP, and likewise for the subsequent models. The 
sequential nature of the analysis causes the observations to be reduced as one moves from one 
model to the next.  The number of explanatory variables, eleven, is the same for all the models 
except for CNEQIP, where MALE is eliminated from the model due to estimation problems. 
      A summary of the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for the entire sample of 
cattle producers completing the questionnaire is given in Table 8. On average, the portion of 
farmland owned by surveyed cattle farmers in Louisiana was 0.68. Most cattle farms had streams 
flowing not more than one mile away from the farm. On average, 9% of the farmers surveyed 
met with NRCS personnel four times or more in 2002. Fourteen percent met with LCES agents 
four or more times. The average age of a cattle farmer was 59 years, with the age ranging from 
23 years to 87 years. Eighty-eight percent of the farmers held a high school diploma. On average, 
less than 20 percent of farmers’ net household income came from beef production. Only six 
percent indicated that their farmland used in the cattle operation had been classified by NRCS as 
 42
“highly erodible”.  The total acres of land making up the entire cattle operation averaged 377 
acres. Ninety-five percent of the respondents were males. 
         
TABLE 8: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE ENTIRE SAMPLE (KNEQIP) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
LOWNED 0.68 0.38 0.00 1.0 
NRCS 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.0 
FARMSTRM 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.0 
NAGE 5.86 1.26 2.30 8.7 
HS 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.0 
PBEEFINC 1.29 0.82 0.00 5.0 
DIVERSE 1.04 1.07 0.00 7.0 
LCES 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.0 
HELA 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.0 
NFARMAC 3.77 7.87 0.01   120.0 
MALE 0.95 0.21 0.00 1.0 
       Number of observations, N = 504. 
        
TABLE 9: LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES (KNEQIP) 
KNEQIP=1 
|Variable β ME S. Error t-stat 
Constant -2.1612 -0.5395 0.2147 -2.513** 
LOWNED  0.2830  0.0706 0.0758  0.932 
NRCS  1.8212  0.3877 0.0795  4.874** 
FARMSTRM -0.0394 -0.0098 0.0551 -0.179 
HELA  1.5918  0.3475 0.0900  3.863** 
HS  0.0954  0.0238 0.0857  0.277 
PBEEFINC  0.0786  0.0196 0.0410  0.479 
DIVERSE  0.2166  0.0541 0.0277  1.949** 
LCES  1.0270  0.2507 0.0495  5.068** 
NFARMAC  0.0558  0.0139 0.0071  1.970** 
NAGE  0.0169  0.0042 0.0221  0.191 
MALE  0.5047  0.1226 0.1194  1.027 
 β: Coefficient estimate.          Pseudo R2:0.14      
ME: marginal effect               DF=9 
 S. error: standard error 
 t-stat: t-statistic. t-critical: 0.05** level =1.833 , 0.10 level = 1.383 
 (source: generated using the SAS function TINV) 
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Table 9 provides the parameter estimates for the probability of being aware of EQIP. Results do 
not indicate that the portion of acres owned by a cattle farmer influences awareness of EQIP. The 
probability of a farmer being aware of EQIP increases by 0.39 for those who have had contact 
with NRCS at least 4 times relative to those who have not (P-value < 0.05). 
4.3.1.1 Knowledge of EQIP   
         The distance between a stream and a cattle farm, age of a farmer, the holding of a high 
school diploma and percentage of income from beef were not found to influence knowledge of 
the EQIP. An increase in one additional enterprise run by a farmer (besides the beef cattle 
operation) increased the probability of his awareness of EQIP by 0.05, and had a significant 
effect on the farmer’s awareness of EQIP at the 0.1 significant level (P-value < 0.10). 
The probability of a farmer being aware of EQIP increases by 0.25 if the farmer had four or more 
contacts with LCES personnel in the year 2002 (P-value < 0.05). 
         If a farm has been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS, the probability of the farmer being 
aware of EQIP increases by 0.35, significant at the 0.01 level. A 100-acre increase in the total 
acres of land used in the cattle operation increases the probability of a farmer being aware of 
EQIP by 0.02 (P-value < 0.05). MALE was not found to influence awareness of the EQIP. 
         In summary, the explanatory variables that were significant for the model KNEQIP were 
NRCS, DIVERSE, LCES, HELA and NFARMAC. This indicates that farmers who are more 
likely to be aware of EQIP are those who met with NRCS and /or LCES agents four or more 
times in the year 2002, diversified farmers, farmers whose lands have been declared “highly 
erodible” by NRCS, and farmers operating larger beef cattle farms. All signs on significant 
variables are as expected. 
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TABLE 10: THE PREDICTED AND ACTUAL NUMBERS OF FARMERS AWARE OF 
EQIP 
 Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total
0 181 39 220 
1 120 108 228 
Total 301 147 448 
 
         Table 10 displays the predicted and actual results of the number of farmers aware of EQIP. 
Awareness is represented by the number, 1, and non-awareness is represented by the number, 0.  
The actual results indicate that 49% of the cattle farmers in Louisiana had no knowledge of EQIP 
while 51% of them had knowledge of EQIP. The percentage correctly predicted was 64.5%  
4.3.1.2 Application for EQIP Funds 
         Table 11 gives a brief description of the descriptive statistics for farmers who had 
knowledge of EQIP, used in APEQIP. With the exception of the number of observations being 
reduced from 504 to 228, the means and standard deviations did not change greatly.  It can be 
observed from the table that farmers having knowledge of EQIP operated beef cattle farms on 
land sizes that ranged from a minimum of 3 acres to a maximum of 12,000 acres and, on 
average, owned larger portions of their farmland (0.7). Most (88%) held a high school diploma, 
and 74% had streams flowing less than a mile from their farms. 
         The parameter estimates for the model APEQIP are summarized in Table 12. The variable 
LOWNED was not found to significantly affect farmers’ application to EQIP, as suggested by 
the t-statistic (P-value > 0.10). The probability of a farmer applying for EQIP funds increases by 
0.39 if the farmer had contact with NRCS at least 4 times in 2002 (P-value < 0.01). Stream 
 45
flowing through a farm decreases the probability of a farmer applying to EQIP by 0.16. Age of a 
farmer did not significantly influence application for EQIP funds. Unexpectedly, the holding of a  
 
TABLE 11: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (APEQIP) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
LOWNED 0.68 0.38 0.00 1.0 
NRCS 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.0 
FARMSTRM 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.0 
NAGE 5.83     1.22      2.70 8.5 
HS 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.0 
PBEEFINC 1.34 0.89 0.00 5.0 
DIVERSE 1.24 1.11 0.00 6.0 
LCES 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.0 
HELA 0.09. 0.29 0.00 1.0 
NFARMAC 4.92 9.70 0.03   120.0 
                               Number of observations, N = 228. 
          
TABLE 12: LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES (APEQIP) 
APEQIP=1 
|Variable β ME S. Error t-stat 
Constant  2.1948  0.5367 0.2614  2.053** 
LOWNED -0.2560 -0.0626 0.1058 -0.592 
NRCS  2.0310  0.3867 0.0677  5.707** 
FARMSTRM -0.6495 -0.1584 0.0728 -2.174** 
HELA  0.9214  0.2034 0.1063  1.913** 
HS -1.1145 -0.2390 0.0952 -2.510** 
PBEEFINC -0.4587 -0.1122 0.0579 -1.938** 
DIVERSE  0.0853  0.0208 0.0345  0.604 
LCES  0.1916  0.0470 0.0766  0.614 
NFARMAC  0.0102  0.0025 0.0044  0.567 
NAGE -0.0892 -0.0218 0.0309 -0.707 
β: Coefficient estimate      pseudo R2 :0.12
ME: marginal effect                    df = 8 
 S. error: standard error 
 t-stat: t-statistic. 
t-critical : 0.05** level =1.860 , 0.10 level = 1.397 






high school diploma decreased the probability of a farmer applying to EQIP by 0.24 (P-value < 
0.05). Surprisingly, a 20% increase in the percentage of net household income from beef 
production decreased the probability of a farmer applying to EQIP by 0.11 (P-value < 0.05). The 
numbers of enterprises run by a farmer apart from beef cattle operation and the number of times 
a farmer was in contact with LCES officials were not found to be significant. 
      If a farm had been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS, this increased the probability of the 
farmer applying by 0.20 (P-value< 0.05). A 100-acre increase in the size of a beef cattle 
operation was not found to influence application to the EQIP. The probability of a farmer with a 
stream flowing through his farm, applying to EQIP, decreases by 0.16 at the 0.05 significant 
level.    
         In summary, the explanatory variables that turned out significant for the model APEQIP 
were NRCS, HS, PBEEFINC, HELA and FARMSTRM, indicating that farmers more likely to 
apply to EQIP are those who have met with NRCS officials four or more times in the year 2002; 
who do not hold a high school diploma, who have a greater percentage of their net household 
income coming from beef production, whose lands have been declared “highly erodible” by 
NRCS, and do not have a stream running through the farm.  
 
TABLE 13: THE PPREDICTED AND ACTUAL NUMBERS OF FARMERS WHO 
APPLIED TO EQIP 
 Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
0 67 32 99 
1 48 77 125 
Total 115 109 224 
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TABLE 14: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (PEQIP) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
LOWNED 0.67 0.36 0.00 1.0 
NRCS 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.0 
RSTRM 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.0 
NAGE 5.85 1.22 2.70 8.5 
HS 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.0 
PBEEFINC 1.29 0.84 0.00 5.0 
DIVERSE 1.25 1.14 0.00 6.0 
LCES 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.0 
HELA 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.0 
NFARMAC 4.94 6.78 0.16 50.0  
MALE 0.95 0.21 0.00 1.0 
                            Number of observations, N = 224. 
  
         
TABLE 15: LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES (PEQIP) 
PEQIP=1 
|Variable β ME S. Error t-stat 
Constant  0.4134  0.0887 0.2745  0.323 
LOWNED  0.4044  0.0867 0.1223  0.709 
NRCS  0.7696  0.1506 0.0914  1.648* 
FARMSTRM -0.4571 -0.0997 0.0893 -1.117 
HELA -0.0765 -0.0166 0.1283 -0.129 
HS  0.3048  0.0677 0.1228  0.551 
PBEEFINC  0.7376  0.1582 0.0877  1.804* 
DIVERSE -0.1942 -0.0416 0.0404 -1.030 
LCES  0.4907  0.1077 0.0912  1.181 
NFARMAC -0.0588 -0.0126 0.0078 -1.612* 
NAGE -0.1436 -0.0308 0.0353 -0.871 
 β: Coefficient estimate        pseudo R2:0.07 
ME: marginal effect                    df = 8 
 S. error: standard error 
 t-stat: t-statistic. 
t-critical : 0.05** level =1.860 , 0.10 level = 1.397 




Table 13 gives the predicted and actual results of the numbers of farmers who applied (1) and 
who did not apply for EQIP (0). Of the 228 farmers having knowledge of EQIP, 43% had not 
applied to EQIP and 55% had applied to the program. The percentage correctly predicted was 
64.30%. 
4.3.1.3 Receipt of Payment Under EQIP  
         The descriptive statistics for farmers who applied to EQIP is given in Table 14. It involves 
the 224 farmers who applied to the program. 
The portions are not greatly different from the overall sample, though one notices that these 
individuals were more likely to have had contact with the NRCS, to be more diversified, to have 
had contact with LCES, to have highly erodible land, and to have larger farm acreages. 
The parameter estimates for the model PEQIP for each explanatory variable are displayed in 
Table 15. Results show that NRCS, PBEEFINC and NFARMAC were the only variables found 
to be significant at the 0.10 level. 
The probability of a farmer receiving EQIP funds increases by 0.15 if the farmer had contact 
with NRCS at least 4 times in 2002. An increase in the percentage of net household income 
coming from beef production increased the probability of a farmer receiving EQIP funds. The 
probability of a farmer receiving EQIP funds decreased if the farmer operated a larger farm. 
 
TABLE 16: THE PREDICTED AND ACTUAL NUMBERS OF FARMERS WHO 
RECIEVED PAYMENT UNDER EQIP 
 Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
0 11 33 44 
1 6 88 94 
Total 17 121 138 
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TABLE 17: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CNEQIP 
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
LOWNED 0.71 0.34 0.00 1.0 
NRCS 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.0 
FARMSTRM 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.0 
AGE 5.77 1.17 2.90 8.4 
HS 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.0 
PBEEFINC 1.25 0.73 0.00 5.0 
DIVERSE 1.22 1.02 0.00 4.0 
LCES 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.0 
HELA 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.0 
NFARMAC 4.39 6.74 0.16       50.0 
                      Number of observations, N = 138.  
        
 
TABLE 18: LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES (CNEQIP) 
CNEQIP=1 
|Variable β ME S. Error t-stat 
Constant -0.1145 -0.0045 0.1827 -0.025 
LOWNED 0.5141  0.0203 0.0525  0.387 
NRCS 0.3886  0.0167 0.0442  0.378 
FARMSTRM 0.5590  0.0024 0.0420  0.572 
HELA 0.5462  0.0267 0.0868  0.308 
HS 1.0310  0.0309 0.0399  0.774 
PBEEFINC -1.9549 -0.0774 0.1038 -0.745 
DIVERSE -0.4677 -0.0185 0.0265 -0.698 
LCES -0.2660 -0.0109 0.0356 -0.308 
NFARMAC -0.3608 -0.0143 0.0107 -1.328 
NAGE -0.0570 -0.0023 0.0142 -0.158 
 β: Coefficient estimate       pseudo R2:0.13 
ME: marginal effect                    df = 8 
 S. error: standard error 
 t-stat: t-statistic. 
t-critical : 0.05** level =1.860 , 0.10 level = 1.397 




        From Table 16, the actual results indicated that 32% of farmers in Louisiana applying for 
EQIP did not receive EQIP funds, while 68% of them did. Percentage correctly predicted was 
71.7%, in spite of the general lack of significance of explanatory variables. 
4.3.1.4 Cancellation of EQIP  
         Table 17 gives a brief description of the descriptive statistics for farmers who have been 
accepted to EQIP, involving the 138 farmers who had received EQIP funding.            
         Table 18 gives the parameter estimates for the model, CNEQIP, for each explanatory 
variable. None of the estimates were significant, suggesting that non of the variables 
significantly affected the choice made by farmers to cancel an EQIP contract.          
         It can be observed from Table 19 that, of the 85 farmers who received EQIP funding, 82% 
did not cancel the program and 9% cancelled EQIP after being accepted to the program. 
TABLE 19: NUMBER OF FARMERS WHO CANCELLED  EQIP 
 Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
0 77 0 77 
1 8 0 8 
Total 85 0 85 
 
          The pseudo R-square values indicate the models’ fits. The binary logit models had 
relatively low pseudo R-squared values, which is rather common for logistic regressions 
(Onianwa et al.). The pseudo R-squared values for the models, KNEQIP, APEQIP, PEQIP and 





4.4 SEQUENTIAL MODEL RESULTS 
4.4.1 Sequential Response Model 
         Tables 20 to 24 display the sequential model results. The sequential model consists of five 
equations: EQIP0 is the equation that represents the probability that farmers have no knowledge 
of EQIP and is equivalent to the logit model, KNEQIP=0. EQIP1 represents the probability that 
farmers have knowledge of EQIP but do not apply for EQIP funds and is equivalent to the 
combination of the logit models: (KNEQIP=1, APEQIP=0). EQIP2 represents the probability that 
farmers have knowledge of EQIP, applied for funds, but did not receive payment and is 
equivalent to the combination of the logit models: (KNEQIP=1, APEQIP=1, PEQIP=0). EQIP3 
represents the probability that farmers have knowledge of EQIP, applied for funds, received 
payment, and did not cancel the EQIP contract later which is equivalent to the logit model 
combinations: (KNEQIP=1, APEQIP=1, PEQIP=1, CNEQIP=0). The final equation, EQIP4, 
represents the probability that farmers have knowledge of EQIP, applied for funds, received 
payments, but canceled the contract later, and is also equivalent to the logit model combinations: 
(KNEQIP=1, APEQIP=1, PEQIP=1, CNEQIP=1). The results being reported are the marginal 
effects, ME. 
4.4.1.1 Probability of Farmers Having No Knowledge of EQIP 
         Table 20 gives a description of the parameter estimates for the sequential response model 
EQIP0 ≈ (KNEQIP=0).  Of the eleven explanatory variables used in the equation, five of them 
were found to be significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels. These variables were 
NRCS, DIVERSE, LCES, HELA and NFARMAC. A unit increase in each of these variables 
resulted in 0.45 (P-value < 0.05), 0.05 (P-value < 0.10), 0.26 (P-value < 0.05), 0.40 (P-value <  
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TABLE 20: SEQUENTIAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES (EQIP0) 
 
EQIP0 = KNEQIP=0 
Variable ME0 S. error0 t-stat0 
Constant 0.5393 0.2152  2.5056** 
LOWNED -0.0706 0.0756 -0.9338 
NRCS -0.4544 0.0771 -5.8936** 
FARMSTRM 0.0098 0.0549  0.1793 
HELA -0.3972 0.0527 -7.5421** 
HS -0.0238 0.0874 -0.2722 
PBEEFINC -0.0196 0.0413 -0.4745 
DIVERSE -0.0540 0.0282 -1.9195** 
LCES -0.2563 0.0497 -5.1543** 
NFARMAC -0.0139 0.0074 -1.8849** 
NAGE -0.0042 0.0221 -0.1908 
MALE -0.1259 0.1164 -1.0824 















                                        
 
                                            ME: marginal effect               df=9 
                                             S. error: standard error 
                                              t-stat: t-statistic. t-critical: 0.05** level =1.833 , 0.10 level = 1.383 
                                            (source: generated using the SAS function TINV) 
                   
 
TABLE 21: SEQUENTIAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES (EQIP1) 
EQIP1 = (KNEQIP=1 APEQIP=0) 
Variable ME1 S. error1 t-stat1 
Constant -0.0326 0.2152 -0.1510 
LOWNED 0.0083 0.0756  0.1091 
NRCS -0.1353 0.0771 -1.7540** 
FARMSTRM -0.0672 0.0549 -1.2250 
HELA -0.1340 0.0527 -2.5450** 
HS -0.1262 0.0874 -1.4430* 
PBEEFINC -0.0470 0.0413 -1.1370 
DIVERSE 0.0421 0.0282  1.4948* 
LCES -0.0991 0.0497 -1.9930** 
NFARMAC 0.0093 0.0074  1.2654 
NAGE -0.0089 0.0221 -0.4040 
MALE -0.0400 0.1163 -0.3440 
                                     ME: marginal effect                         df = 9 
                                     S. error: standard error 
                                     t-stat: t-statistic 
                                     t-critical : 0.05** level =1.833 , 0.10 level = 1.383 
                                     (Source: generated using the SAS function TINV) 
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0.05) and 0.01 (P-value < 0.05) decreases in the variables, respectively, as all other variables are 
held constant. These results are consistent in sign with those in Table 9, with slight differences in 
marginal effects due to their recalculation in the spreadsheet, consistent with the calculation of 
EQIP1… EQIP4. 
         The results, thus, indicate that the probability of a farmer not being aware of EQIP 
decreases for those farmers who have had contact with NRCS and/or LCES officials at least four 
times in 2002, are diversified, whose farms have been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS and 
for farmers who operate beef cattle farms on larger tracts of land. All signs on significant 
variables were as expected. 
 4.4.1.2 Probability of Farmers Having Knowledge of EQIP but Not Applying  
         Five of the explanatory variables in the sequential model equation, EQIP1 ≈ (KNEQIP=1, 
APEQIP=0) (Table 22), were found to be significant at the 0.10 significance level. These 
variables included NRCS, HS, HELA, DIVERSE and LCES. The marginal effects suggests that 
a unit increase in these variables resulted in a decrease in the probability of a farmer having 
knowledge of EQIP but not applying to it by 0.14, 0.13, 0.13, 0.04 and 0.10, respectively, 
holding all other variables constant.    
         This finding suggests that  male farmers who have had contact with NRCS officials at least 
4 times in 2002, are holders of a high school diploma and whose farms have been declared 
“highly erodible” by NRCS and have knowledge of EQIP are more likely to apply for EQIP 






4.4.1.3 Probability of Farmers Having Knowledge of EQIP, Applying but Not Receiving 
             EQIP Funding 
 
TABLE 22: SEQUENTIALPARAMETER ESTIMATES (EQIP2) 
EQIP2 = (KNEQIP=1 APEQIP=1 PEQIP=0) 
Variable ME2 S. error2 t-stat2 
Constant -0.0554 0.3875 -0.1430 
LOWNED -0.0163 0.1139 -0.1430 
NRCS -0.1414 0.0654 -2.1610** 
FARMSTRM 0.0289 0.0758  0.3811 
HELA -0.0126 0.0757 -0.1670 
HS 0.0819 0.1009 0.8113 
PBEEFINC 0.0021 0.0582  0.0368 
DIVERSE -0.0151 0.0371 -0.4070 
LCES -0.0710 0.0794 -0.8950 
NFARMAC -0.0024 0.0046 -0.5270 
NAGE 0.0133 0.0339  0.3923 
 ME: marginal effect                    df = 8 
 S. error: standard error 
 t-stat: t-statistic. 
t-critical : 0.05** level =1.860 , 0.10 level = 1.397 
(Source: generated using the SAS function TINV) 
 
 
                 The results obtained for the marginal effect of the equation, EQIP2 ≈ (KNEQIP=1, 
APEQIP=1, PEQIP=0) (Table 22), showed one explanatory variable being significant at the 0.05 
level of significance: NRCS. The results suggested that a unit increase in this variable decreased 
the probability of a farmer having knowledge of EQIP, applying to the program, but not 
receiving EQIP funding.  
4.4.1.4 Probability of Farmers Having Knowledge of EQIP, Applying, Receiving Payment 
             and Not Canceling EQIP 
 
         Table 23 gives the marginal effects for the independent variables for the sequential model 
equation, EQIP3 ≈ (KNEQIP=1, APEQIP=1, PEQIP=1, CNEQIP=0). However, none of the 
variables were found to be significant. 
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TABLE 23: SEQUENTIAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES (EQIP3) 
                      EQIP3 = (KNEQIP=1 APEQIP=1 PEQIP=0) 
Variable ME3 S. error3 t-stat3 
Constant -7.33E-06 0.275584 -0.0000 
LOWNED -1.59E-05 0.119405       -0.0001 
NRCS -1.39E-03 0.085762       -0.0160 
FARMSTRM  2.73E-05 0.090734        0.0003 
HELA -1.00E-03 0.082211       -0.0120 
HS  1.07E-03 0.118758        0.0090 
PBEEFINC  4.15E-05 0.092729        0.0004 
DIVERSE  9.33E-06 0.042197        0.0002 
LCES -3.88E-03 0.090267       -0.0430 
NFARMAC  8.13E-06 0.007731        0.0011 
NAGE  3.88E-06 0.034605        0.0001 
                                          ME: marginal effect                    df =8 
                                          S. error: standard error 
                                          t-stat: t-statistic. t-critical : 0.05** level =1.860 , 0.10 level = 1.397 
                                          (Source: generated using the SAS function TINV) 
 
     
4.4.1.5 Probability of Farmers Having Knowledge of EQIP, Applying, Receiving Payment 
            but Canceling EQIP Later 
         Table 24 gives the marginal effects for the independent variables for the sequential model 
equation EQIP4 ≈ (KNEQIP=1, APEQIP=1, PEQIP=1, CNEQIP=1).  However, none of the 
variables were found to be significant. 
The estimated  probabilities for the sequential model (table 25) indicate that, of the 504 cattle 
farmers who completed the survey questionnaire, the probability of a farmer having no 
knowledge of EQIP (EQIP0) was 0.481; the probability of a farmer having knowledge of EQIP, 
but not applying to the program (EQIP1) was 0.298; the probability of a farmer having 
knowledge of EQIP, applying to the program but not receiving payment (EQIP2) was 0.152; the 
probability of a farmer having knowledge of EQIP, applying to the program, receiving payment 
and not canceling the program later (EQIP3) was 0.003; and the probability of a farmer having 
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knowledge of EQIP, applying to the program, receiving payment and canceling the program later 
(EQIP4) was 0.066. 
  
TABLE 24: SEQUENTIAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES (EQIP4) 
EQIP4 = (KNEQIP=1 APEQIP=1 PEQIP=1) 
Variable ME4 S. error4 t-stat4 
Constant -0.0278    1563.6490 -0.000020 
LOWNED -0.0118 71.8516 -0.000200 
NRCS -0.0515 63.4695 -0.000800 
FARMSTRM 0.0448 42.1528 0.001100 
HELA -0.0435 58.4054 -0.000700 
HS 0.0195 58.2024 0.000300 
PBEEFINC -0.0084    1699.4490 -0.000005 
DIVERSE -0.0037 31.8566 -0.000100 
LCES -0.0725 19.8034 -0.004000 
NFARMAC -0.0002 26.0608 -0.000009 
NAGE 0.0072   9.0881 0.000800 
                                           ME: marginal effect                    df =8 
                                          S. error: standard error 
                                          t-stat: t-statistic. t-critical : 0.05** level =1.860 , 0.10 level = 1.397 
                                          (Source: generated using the SAS function TINV) 
 






TABLE 25: THE ESTIMATED PROBABILITY VALUES FOR THE SEQUENTIAL 
MODELS 
 EQIP0 EQIP1 EQIP2 EQIP3 EQIP4 
Probability 0.481 0.298 0.152 0.003 0.066 
 




4.5.1 Comparing the Estimated Probability Results of the Logit and Sequential Models and 
          with Results of Other Studies 
 
         Comparing variables that were found to be significant for the sequential and non-sequential 
models, NRCS, DIVERSE, LCES, HELA (Rahelizatovo and Gillespie; Kim et al.) and 
NFARMAC (Cooper and Keim), were found to be significant for both KNEQIP and EQIP0 
models indicating that a unit increase in the number of times a farmer comes in contact with 
natural resource conservation service officials and/or Louisiana corporative extension services, 
diversification, the number of farmlands declared “highly erodible” and the size of cattle 
operations, results in an increase in the probability of a cattle farmer in Louisiana being aware of 
EQIP and thus subsequently adopting BMPs. Also, the results obtained for the model EQIP0 was 
not surprising since educational programs for EQIP are conducted by NRCS via flyers, 
newsletters, public meetings, public notices, word of mouth, etc. This targets all agricultural 
producer groups.  
         NRCS, HS, PBEEFINC and HELA were found to be significant for both models APEQIP 
and EQIP1, indicating that a unit increase in the number of farmers who have had contact with 
NRCS at least 4 times in 2002, the amount of farmlands declared “highly erodible”, the 
percentage of net household income that comes from beef production, would result in an increase 
in the probability of a farmer applying to the EQIP program and subsequent in adopting BMPs. 
However, the variable HS had opposing signs, indicating for the logit model that farmers that 
hold high school diploma are less likely to apply to EQIP, while the sequential model suggests 
that farmers that have knowledge of EQIP and are holders of high school diploma are more 
likely to apply for EQIP funding. The sequential result is consistent with Katchova and Miranda 
findings that educated farmers were more likely to enter into marketing contracts, Cooper and 
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Keim results which indicated that more educated farmers were more likely to adopt water quality 
protection practices, and Ersado et al.’s findings that more educated farmers were more likely to 
adopt productive and land enhancing technologies.   
         Based on the Louisiana ranking form used to determine whom receives EQIP funding, 
farmers most likely to receive EQIP would include farmers whose lands: (1) are within the 
drainage area of a water body that has been designated by the state water quality management 
plan, (2) consist predominantly of soil with a surface layer K factor equal to or greater than 0.43 
and (3) are within a parish listed as a significantly threatened and endangered species habitat. 
Three additional factors include: (4) planned treatment would assist the farmer in complying 
with federal or state environmental laws, (5) the practice is environmentally beneficial, and (6) 
the farmer has participated in a master farmer program. It was not surprising that, for the 
sequential model EQIP1, farmers who had contact with NRCS and /or LCES officials at least 4 
times in 2002, held high school diplomas, or whose farmlands had been declared “highly 
erodible” had higher probabilities of applying to the EQIP program. NRCS was found to be 
significant in the EQIP2 model, indicating that farmers who had contact with NRCS at least 4 
times in 2002 were more likely to receive EQIP funding.  
         Ersado et al; Key and McBride; and Katchova and Miranda found that male farmers with 
greater income from their farms were more likely to adopt BMPs. The results of these studies, 
however, did not determine whether these groups of farmers were more likely to be accepted 
under conservation programs such as the EQIP.  
         Generally, variables that significantly affect farmer’s awareness of EQIP and their decision 
to adopt BMPs were the number of times farmers met with NRCS officials, high school diploma 
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holders, and diversification, whether the farmers land had been declared highly erodible by 
NRCS, and gender.  
         Variables that were considered important in the study a priori, NAGE and LOWNED were 
not found to be significant in any of the models. However, Cooper and Keim indicated that 
farmers who owned greater portions of their land were less likely to adopt BMPs, while Ersado 
et al. indicated otherwise. Ersado et al., Foltz and Chang, Katchova and Miranda; Kim et al., and 
Rahelizatovo and Gillespie indicated that older farmers are more likely to adopt BMPs, while 


























SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
         In an attempt to control degradation of the environment caused by farming, conservation 
programs have been put in place, one of which is the Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(EQIP).  The EQIP was established in the 1996 Farm Bill, involving the payment of government 
subsidies to landowners willing to implement specific cost-intensive conservation practices. The 
aim of this study is to determine, using logit and sequential models, the awareness of EQIP and 
subsequent adoption of best management practices (BMPs) by cattle farmers in Louisiana.  
         Results of the logit models indicate that farmers who are more likely to be aware of EQIP 
are those who have met with NRCS and /or LCES agents four or more times in the year 2002,  
diversified farmers, farmers whose lands have been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS, and 
farmers operating larger beef cattle farms. Farmers more likely to apply to EQIP are those who 
have met with NRCS officials four or more times in the year 2002, who do not hold high school 
diploma, who have lower percentages of their net household income coming from beef 
production, whose lands have been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS, and males.  
         Farmers who are more likely to receive EQIP funding are farmers who have had contact 
with NRCS officials at least 4 times in 2002. None of the estimates were significant for the 
CNEQIP equation, suggesting that none of the variables significantly affected the decision of 
farmers to cancel EQIP contracts later.  
        Results of the sequential model indicated that the probability of a farmer not being aware of 
EQIP decreases for those farmers who have had contact with NRCS and/or LCES officials at 
least 4 times in 2002, are diversified, whose farms have been declared “highly erodible” by 
NRCS and for farmers who operate beef cattle farms on larger acreages of land. Of the farmers 
who knew of EQIP, those who had contact with NRCS officials at least 4 times in 2002, were 
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holders of high school diploma, whose farms had been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS 
were less likely to have not applied to EQIP. Farmers who had contact with NRCS at least 4 
times in the year 2002 and whose land had been declared “highly erodible” by NRCS were less 
likely to receive EQIP funding. Finally, the sequential model results also suggest that an increase 
in the number of times a farmer had contact with NRCS decreased the probability of a farmer 
later canceling the contract. 
         The estimated probabilities for the logit model indicate that, of the 504 cattle farmers who 
completed the survey questionnaire, 49% had no knowledge of EQIP and 51% had knowledge of 
EQIP. For the 228 farmers who had knowledge of EQIP, 43% did not apply to EQIP and 55% 
applied to the program. Results indicated that 32% of farmers received EQIP funding while 68% 
did not. Of the 85 farmers who received funds under EQIP, 82% did not cancel the program and 
9% cancelled after being accepted to the program. The sequential analysis results indicate that 
the 49% of farmers in Louisiana had no knowledge of EQIP. The percentage of farmers having 
knowledge of EQIP but not applying to the program was 30%. The percentage of farmers having 
knowledge of EQIP, applying to the program but not receiving payment was 15%. The 
percentage who had knowledge of EQIP, applied to the program, received payment and did not 
cancel the program later was 1% and the percentage who had knowledge of EQIP, applied to the 
program, received payment and later canceled the EQIP contract was 10%. 
           For both models, results generally indicate that the number of times a farmer comes in 
contact with NRCS and/or LCES officials, whether he is diversified and the size of his cattle 
operation affects his awareness, application and eventual adoption of BMPs under EQIP. This is 
not surprising since NRCS has been given the authority to administer the program. It does 
suggest that further funding of education by NRCS could increase adoption rates. The Louisiana 
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Cooperative Extension Service also served as a source of information, but without the authority 
to administer EQIP, no significant results were found beyond the knowledge of EQIP. In 2003, 
the Assistant State Conservationist of NRCS in Louisiana indicated that officials who administer 
the EQIP went out to inform producers of the conservation provisions of the 2002 Farm Bill and 
the result was that ranchers and farmers applied for funding, resulting in significant backlogs in 
all programs (Marcantel).  
         A significant number of farmers whose lands had been declared “highly erodible’ by 
NRCS, according to the results obtained, had knowledge of EQIP, applied to the program and 
adopted BMPs under EQIP. This buttresses the fact that, since NRCS has been authorized to 
administer the EQIP, the more contacts they make with farmers significantly affects their 
awareness of EQIP and their subsequent adoption of BMPs under EQIP. 
         The closeness of a cattle farm to a stream did not significantly affect farmers’ awareness 
and eventual adoption of BMPs under EQIP. Agricultural production has been identified as a 
major cause of water pollution in the United States (Feinerman et al., Taylor et al.,  Kaplan et al.,  
Peterson and Boisvert). The movement of byproducts from farming practices to waterways, 
across fields, makes it difficult to identify the individual sources (Taylor et al.). In order to 
reduce or eliminate agricultural run-off, farmers close to or miles away from streams should be 
made aware of the EQIP and encouraged to adopt BMPs.  
         Farmers who own large portions of their farmlands, run larger cattle operations and receive 
larger percentages of their net household income from beef production had more knowledge of 
EQIP and were more likely to adopt BMPs. They are also the worse offenders when it comes to 
manure pollutants (Feinerman et al.). Keeping this group of farmers in the program would put 
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them in check.  They could also help in the funding of the program and also serve as informants 
and role models to new farmers (Taylor et al). 
         From the results obtained, farmers who hold high school diplomas were more likely to 
apply to the EQIP. This is not surprising, given past studies that have shown more highly 
educated farmers to be the greater adopters of technology.  
         The sequential logit analysis is the best model for this study because it does not exhibit 
Independence of irrelevance alternatives (IIA) and is an improvement on conditional analysis. 
         It was expected that results obtained from this study would provide an idea on the number 
and type of cattle farmers in Louisiana aware of the EQIP program and involved in its activities. 
It was also hoped that this information would help in the structuring of policies that govern the 
EQIP and, thus, would further improve conditions in cattle operations and the agricultural sector 
as a whole. Further studies might involve carrying out similar analysis in other states in order to 
get a better picture of how many cattle producers in the United States are aware of the EQIP and 
their subsequent adoption of BMPs. 
         A limitation associated with this study is that the sequential analysis had to be calculated by 
hand after obtaining the logit model results, making it tedious and prone to human errors. It is 
hoped that a program would be developed that can calculate sequential analysis problems more 
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function     
Restricted 
log 





freedom    
Prob[ChiSqd 
> value] 
KNEQIP 448 -276.6069     -309.5590     65.90422     11 .0000000      
APEQIP 224 -134.3096     -154.1055     39.59183     11 .4200401E-04 
PEQIP 138 -78.14023     -86.33394     16.38743     11 .1273463      









































INFORMATION STATISTICS FOR THE DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS 
Model Criterion F (log 
L)     
Bayes Info 
Criterion      
Pseudo R-




KNEQIP -276.60686      620.36645       .10645       64.50893      
APEQIP -134.30956      328.14723       .12846       64.28571      
PEQIP -78.14023       210.48025       .09491       71.73913      









































(Original survey composed by Seon-Ae Kim and used with her permission in this work.) 
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